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Abstract 
 
Growing number of vehicles in use has ushered in the service to provide human and 
resource safety. The present trend calls for the application of technology to automate 
safety measures in road traffic and since has been known as Intelligent Transport 
System (ITS). Vehicular Ad hoc Network is like a fork to Mobile Ad hoc Network, 
where the nodes are mobile vehicles moving in constrained road topology. VANET 
networks are envisioned to be used in practical ITS systems around the world.  A 
network standard has been developed as Wireless Access In Vehicular Environment 
(IEEE 802.11p) to be used in VANET which is an amendment to IEEE 802.11 standard. 
With every new technological applications especially computers and network 
applications, come new security challenges. Every network in modern day is susceptible 
to security attacks and VANET is no exception. The most infamous of those attacks is 
the Distributed Denial of Service Attack which is unavoidable because unlike other 
security attacks the data packets used in it are legitimate packets. In this thesis work 
previous solutions are reviewed and a new offensive measure for detection, mitigation 
and prevention has been proposed. 
Keywords: VANET, vehicular communication, network, security, DDos 
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter covers the basics of thesis work with introduction to VANET and 
Distributed Denial of Service. Further, the problem statement and motivation for project 
work has been defined. 
1.1 Introduction to VANET 
Vehicular ad hoc network is a communication network for vehicle to vehicle (V2V) and 
vehicle to infrastructure (V2I) communications developed mainly for establishing an 
Intelligent Transport System (ITS) in road traffic for the purpose of prevention of 
accident, post-accident investigation, mitigation of traffic jams and other non-safety 
applications. There are 3 basic components of VANET communication i.e. On board 
unit (OBU), Road side unit (RSU) and Application unit (AU). For communication 
among vehicles and in between RSU and vehicles a communication channel namely 
Dedicated Short Range Communication (DSRC) is reserved by different governing 
authorities around the world.  DSRC is an umbrella term for communication channel 
meant for automotive use. The Federal Communication Commission of United States 
allocated 75 MHz of spectrum line in the 5.9 GHz band for ITS. Similarly, the 
European Telecommunication Standards Institute allocated 30MHz of spectrum in 5.9 
GHz band. The different DSRC systems of world differ thus rendering them 
incompatible with one another. India is yet to define such communication channel for 
ITS. As for development and standardization of VANET IEEE community named 
Technical Subcommittee on Vehicular Networks and Telematics Application (VNTA) 
has been established. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement and Motivation 
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Like any other network, vehicular network is also prone to security attacks. The three 
main security goals are confidentiality, integrity and availability. The focus of this 
thesis work is availability. Availability is most important security requirement because 
as the name suggests any service must be available for use whenever requested by the 
users. Denial of Service attacks is the most ubiquitous, easy to implement and 
unavoidable for most of the time. The attack gets worse when a distributed denial of 
service attack is implemented where there is more than one perpetrator are executing the 
attack. Ddos attack can occur in any layer of network communication model and 
accordingly the methods of attacks are distinguished. In our present case of VANET 
which uses wave protocol stack, the obvious layer susceptible to DDos attack is 
transport layer. Transport layer is responsible for end to end connection, flow control 
and error recovery. This layer responds to service request from application layer which 
is running for software application and provides a transparent data transfer between two 
nodes. Traditional wired network like Ethernet, WLAN uses Transmission Control 
Protocol and User Datagram Protocol in transport layer. The fact is Mobile Ad hoc 
Network (MANET) and more especially VANET has variable network topology which 
creates problem for TCP to work efficiently. To be more specific VANET is prone to 
constant packet loss because vehicles are constantly moving and as such TCP 
misinterpret this as network congestion. TCP will then execute congestion control 
algorithms to mitigate the congestion but will fail since congestion was not the cause for 
packet loss. Nevertheless TCP is presently used in VANET as most of the application 
layer protocols like FTP, HTTP and TELNET which constitute framework the 
applications in application layer are build on top of TCP. Research and development 
process for new transport layer schemes are undergoing but TCP is the current standard 
for transport layer in VANET. As such I have considered this for my thesis work. 
 
1.3 Thesis Objective 
 
Given the nature of VANET, denial of service attacks and distributed denial of service 
attacks are unavoidable. The main objective of my thesis work is to provide a clever 
approach to not only detect the attack but also to prevent it in future time. Though the 
phrase “future time” is overkill as perpetrators would again find a way to execute their 
dirty business but at least for the time whence network can be made available. I have 
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proposed a method to zone out the attacks so that legitimate users can carry on using the 
network and attackers are deceived into thinking that they are being successful in 
denying users of network services. Furthermore, present challenges and a possible 
solution to identify the adversary are given. 
 
1.4 Thesis Organization 
 
The contents of rest of the thesis are summarized below: 
Chapter 2 gives overview architecture, components, characteristics and applications of 
VANET followed by brief summary of WAVE protocol stack. 
Chapter 3 covers the denial of Service and distributed denial of service attacks and their 
relevance in VANET network. 
Chapter 4 covers the literature review of various sources and previous works. 
Chapter 5 covers the proposed solution to attack and setup of simulating environment 
for VANET. 
Chapter 6 is the conclusion of the thesis work. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Basic concepts of VANET 
Following technological advancement and fulfilling of every human need with its 
application, safety in transportation is the next step. Road accidents are more frequent in 
the present time than before because of high traffic. The reduced cost of owning a 
vehicle especially cars in urban areas has further worsen the traffic and road accidents. 
Government and transportation industry has called for a system to maintain this chaotic 
scenario using growing technologies. The need for Intelligent Transport Systems has 
ushered in the development of vehicular communication system. This has led to the 
notion of Vehicular Network and the community word given to this system is known as 
Vehicular Ad Hoc Network (VANET) . The following section of this chapter gives 
description of VANET components, architecture, characteristics and application. 
2.1 Architecture of VANET 
 
The three main components of VANET are on board unit (OBU), application unit (AU) 
and road side unit (RSU). Analogous to computer networks each vehicle is represented 
as a network node and OBU and AU sit on the node. The term “ad hoc” implies that 
these kinds of networks are self organizing and providing extemporaneous services.  
Although MANETs, the parent networks, are supposed to be non-infrastructure self 
establishing communication network a road side unit is needed in VANET to facilitate 
internet connectivity and information collections for maintenance of network. Thus we 
can say VANET are hybrid networks whose design has its root in MANET but with few 
modifications to meet the requirement of feasible vehicular environment. There are 
three main communication domains, one in vehicle to vehicle communication (V2V) , 
second is vehicle to infrastructure communication (V2I) and third one of is 
infrastructural domain through which RSU can provide cellular network radio services. 
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Figure 1 VANET used in ITS 
 
Following is the details of components of VANET: 
2.1.1 On board unit: 
This is the central processing power house of vehicular node installed in vehicle. This 
unit can contain a variety of devices that are necessary for communication and 
information processing. A list is given below: 
I. A processor that is needed to process application and communication 
protocols. 
II. A wireless transceiver whose job is to transmit and receive data among 
itself and other vehicles and road side unit. 
III. A GPS receiver for positioning system. 
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IV. A set of sensors to measure various parameters which can then be 
processed into information and distributed in network. Special sensors to 
measure driver physical and mental state can also be employed. 
V. Network interfaces for VANET like IEEE 802.11p card and other 
networks like Bluetooth and infrared communication. 
 
 
Figure 2 MIT developed test OBUs 
Thus OBUs are like computing devices equipped on vehicles to make then work as a 
network node. Their main objectives are information processing, network access, 
message transfer and positioning. There are two possibilities of commercialization of 
OBUs. Either car companies themselves provide their proprietary OBUs fulfilling an 
established standard or they are commercialized as third party. The VANET resolution 
is carried out by most Vehicular companies thus there are more odds of former 
possibility. 
2.1.2 Application unit: 
The application layer of the network is intended to host a variety of safety and non-
safety applications. Application unit is the unit meant to be operated by drivers. AU can 
be a device with input output interfaces like monitor, keypad, headphone jack, USB port 
etc. The AU is connected is either wired connected or wirelessly connected to OBU 
which provide the backbone of network communication. The AU interacts with OBU 
for accessing the network and internet. Its main function is to host user level safety and 
non-safety applications. 
10 
 
2.1.3 Road side unit: 
It is fixed device located on road side that helps in maintaining the network. It is also 
equipped with network interfaces compatible with DSRC and IEEE 802.11p. The RSU 
also facilitates the routing mechanism. The RSU receives and process area oriented 
information for warnings and advertisement. For example messages informing about an 
accident in one area get transmitted to other vehicles by hoping through RSU. It can run 
its own safety and non-safety applications. It also provides internet connectivity to 
vehicles’ OBUs. 
 
The cellular network companies can provides cellular gateway to the VANET whereby 
they publicize commercial advertisement. In this mode the VANET is said to be 
infrastructure based network. On the other hand hen vehicles communicate among 
themselves establishing an ad hoc network, the network is said to be pure ad hoc 
network. These two models go hand in hand in VANET. 
2.2 Characteristics and Challenges of VANET 
Unlike computer network VANET has some differentiating characteristics that bring 
challenges to the direct deployment of existing network standards and hence creates 
urgency for modification of existing standards or development of standalone standards 
for VANET ([5]Shuai Chen, 2013). Some of the main characteristics of VANET are 
described below: 
2.2.1 Different Channel 
For obvious reasons wired channels cannot be used in VANET but utilizing existing 
wireless channels is on speculation. As such various organizations around world has 
been registering dedicated channel for VANET. This channel is collectively known as 
dedicated short range communication. United States and European Union has defined 
their own channel specifications. The U.S version is a 75MHz communication line in 
the 5.9GHz band. A diagram showing different channels of DRSC is shown below: 
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Figure 3 DSRC channels 
A global specification of VANET needed to be established to reduce ambiguity. 
 
2.2.2 Vehicular Devices 
 
On board unit and application unit constitute the devices that are set up inside vehicles. 
On top of that other devices might be needed to facilitate desired objectives. For 
example just like aeroplanes have black boxes that records crucial events and 
occurrences inside it, vehicles can also have such event recording devices. In VANET 
context it is termed as Event Data Recorder. Another device is Global Positioning 
System device which can be integrated with OBU for secure directions. An electronic 
plate can be installed that can act as identifying parameter in the network. Thus there is 
challenge for the development and commercialization of these devices. 
 
2.2.3 Mobility in VANET 
 
VANET is different from wired network like Ethernet because nodes are not fixed in 
this case. Unlike MANET where the nodes have to freedom to move randomly nodes in 
VANET are constrained to road topology and rules and regulation of traffic. The speed 
and position of every car is variable and as such pose a challenge for multi-hop 
networking. 
 
2.2.4 Network Constraints 
There are various network constraints that make it difficult for existing standards to be 
used in VANET and thus call for development of new standards. The presences of 
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obstacle in traffic environment can lead to signal fading. This can impact proper 
delivery of crucial information in time. The DSRC has very short range of bandwidth 
(10-20Mhz) which can lead to frequent congestions. 
2.2.5 Applications 
VANET applications can be broadly divided into safety and non safety application ([1] 
Saif Al-Sultan, 2014). A diagram detailing different applications is shown below: 
 
Figure 4 VANET applications 
 
2.2.6 Security 
Just like any other network secursity threats loom the VANET environments. The main 
topic of discussion is security of availability which is described in later chapters. 
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2.3 WAVE Protocol Stack 
 
IEEE 802.11p along with P1609 family of protocols constitutes the WAVE standard.  
Protocols for different layers are being either ported from previous networks or 
developed separately. The current protocol stacks is shown in the diagram below. 
 
 
HTTP 1609.1 –Application layer 
IEEE 1609.2(Security) , IEEE 1609.3 
(WSMP) 
TCP/UDP –Transport layer 
IPV6 Network layer 
IEEE 802.2 LLC sub layer 
IEEE 802.11 p and 1609.4 MAC sub layer 
IEEE 802.11p a Physical layer 
 
Figure 5 WAVE protocol stack 
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Chapter 3 
 
Distributed Denial of Service 
There are many types of attacks on VANET. Some of them are briefly given below: 
1. Sybil Attack: ([2]Halabi Hasbullah, 2010)The objective of the attacker is to 
scam other nodes into thinking they received some legitimate messages and they 
should act accordingly. One possible scenario is when a driver wants to clear a 
traffic it can launch attacking by sending multiple messages to other nodes each 
with a fabricated source that accident has occurred in the road ahead. Victim 
nodes can withhold themselves from taking that road path while the attacker 
node can drive in cleared road without any hassle. 
 
2. Node Impersonation: A vehicle node can send a modified message of a victim 
node claiming to be real originator. The message can be bogus or which can 
cause harm to victim node. This kind of attack can be solved by including 
unique identification number to nodes. Inclusion of ID can lead to another type 
of attack where victims are exposed of their identity where they wanted so have 
some privacy. 
 
3. Sending false information: This kind of attack is very common as attacker would 
want to disrupt the proper functioning of traffic by sending false information and 
bringing chaos on road. 
 
4. Distributed denial of service is the most infamous type of denial of service 
attack. In computer networks the attacker spoof network IP addresses and 
execute attack on a victim computer denying it resources and accessibility of 
network. The DDos can be classified as according to the layer it is attacking. In 
VANET context the layer I took for probing is transport layer and assumed 
existing TCP is used in it. In general DDos attack is executed by sending 
redundant messages over time making the victim node unable to respond to 
other legitimate messages and thus suspending it to either provide service or 
receive service. The TCP DDos attack is named as SYN flooding attack. 
Following is the description of SYN flooding attack. 
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Figure 6 A TCP handshake 
For two nodes to communicate a TCP connection should be established. A TCP 
handshaking establishes this connection. It consists of 3 steps. In first step the packets 
which are numbered (SYN for synchronization packets) for flow control mechanism is 
send to the receiver. In the second step the receiver send back SYN-ACK (acknowledge 
packet). The connection is established when sender send ACK packet and receiver 
receives it. When only SYN command is sent from one node to another the receiver 
save the SYN message in a data structure. At this point the connection is said to be half 
open. Many nodes can send multiple SYN messages to a node. In DDos attack the 
attacker along with compromised nodes (zombie nodes) send multiple SYN messages to 
victim. The victim node can be devoid of legitimate requests by other nodes when the 
data structure to hold SYN messages is filled with redundant SYN messages.  
 
 
 
 
 
Node 1 Node 2 SY
N  
SYN-
ACK 
AC
K 
SYN 
database 
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Chapter 4 
Literature Review  
 
There are existing solutions to mitigate the denial of service attack [2]. Those solutions 
are based switching channels or technology whenever one channel or technology is 
found to infected with Dos attack. A brief description of the method used is given 
below: 
4.1 Channel Switching 
DSRC model provides a number of channels for communication. There are 7 channels 
each of 10MHz bandwidth having upper cap on data transfer rate of 27Mbps. For 
communication it’s not necessary for all the channels to be active. So any denial of 
service attack on a node can be mitigated by switching to other channel. 
4.2 Technology Switching  
Many communication technologies work with VANET as there are three main 
communication domains namely V2V, V2I and Vehicle to infrastructures. This method 
of solutions suggests the switching of technology whenever a attack is detected.  
4.3 Frequency Hopping Spread Spectrum  
This method increases the bandwidth of signals by adding keys so that packets are sent 
over a set of different frequency range. Whenever an attack is launched, the network 
communication hops into different frequency channel.   
 
All the above solution is carried out by the OBU. OBU is programmed to detect denial 
of service attack. What this means is a load on vehicle resources which is not 
unfavourable unless this hinders with the default working of OBU.  
 
17 
 
 
Figure 7 OBU making decision to mitigate DDos 
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Chapter 5 
Proposed Solution and Simulation Work 
 
Defence mechanisms against DDOs attacks can be classified into prevention, detection, 
mitigation and response. Previous works showed how DDos can be detected and 
mitigated by switching channels and technologies. This is a passive method of dealing 
with DDos where the nodes are attacked no matter what. In my proposal I have 
combined clever method of using SYN cookies and Intrusion detection system to not 
only detect before time but also to prevent any further attack.  
 
Traditional detection schemes rely on signature based detection algorithms that is it run 
on the RSU or the OBU of some authorities like Police cars. The routing protocol 
generates a range of metadata that is then fed back to IDS which then detect the attack. 
But DDos attacks usually cannot be detected until any node is suspended of service 
because most of the packets used to carry out attack are legitimate. So it is given that a 
node will be attack now or in future.  
 
5.1 Introducing Honeypots 
 
My proposal is the deployment of nodes that has same computing resources as the 
normal node in the network whose sole job is to pose as victim. In other word this kind 
of node i.e. honeypot node is a closely monitored computing resource that we want to 
be probed, attacked or even compromised. The honeypot can be physical in which a real 
vehicle can carry this undercover zombie node or it can be virtual node where a vehicle 
(preferably Police cars) runs a parallel node along with its own operation. The 
production value of honeypot is zero and hence any attempt to contact will be 
suspicious by definition. Once a honeypot is deployed the next steps are detection and 
prevention.  
 
The detection scheme is based on clever approach by D.J Bernstein who proposed this 
scheme for Linux kernel patch number 2.0.29. Basically in our SYN flooding example 
our victim node was suspended of services by the attacker when the data structure to 
hold SYN messages are filled. The solution is to send back a particular node a SYN 
cookie containing all the SYN only this node has sent to the receiver and delete the 
SYN messages from receiver end. The receiver end will only respond to the sender 
whenever the sender sends ACK along with SYN cookie. In the mean time space was 
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preserved in the SYN data structure of receiver end. Thus a particular node having 
unique address can only flood SYN messages up to limit. My proposal is to give the 
honey node a small memory data structure that will trigger alert whenever redundant 
SYN messages are found filling the data structure. The detection algorithm can be 
summarized below. 
 
Algorithm Detection 
Input: SYN messages 
Output: Alert on datastructure full  
1  if(synid==SYN.ID&&i=!MEM.size) 
2   cookie=merge(SYN) 
3  send(cookie,ACK) 
4  sum+=1 //global variable 
5  if(ack()==ACK&&receive()!=cookie)  
6  do nothing   
7  elseif(ack()==ACK&&receive()==cookie) 
8  sum-=1 //global variable 
9  if(sum==MEM.size) 
10   alert(“DDOS”) 
12   break 
13 else 
14 Detection(SYN) 
15  end 
 
The algorithm works as follows. The detection program takes SYN, which is a data 
structure holding SYN messages of a particular node identified by synid, MEM which is 
the allocated memory of SYN database, synid and ACK data structure for a particular 
SYN. Our objective is to check whether the database to hold is filled or not. When a 
SYN message arrive line 2 check if it belongs to the same node or not and whether the   
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MEM data base is already filled. If SYN message belongs to same node as received 
previously then a cookie object is created by merging all SYN messages of the same 
node and is send back along with ACK. The sender has two options to send back. One is 
to send the cookie plus ACK or just send ACK. Sending of just ACK has no effect as it 
will not be acknowledged and the connection will be disconnected. If ACK with cookie 
is received then sum variable is decremented thus maintaining the MEM memory. 
Whenever sum equals to MEM then the database to hold SYN messages is filled an 
attack has been detected. The else condition passes control to recursive Detection 
program with different node id as determined by synid.  
 
Up until now our honey has been compromised and detection has been done. The 
second part is to prevent further Dos attack. Just like any adversary attack the weakest 
link the DDos will be executed on similar node having security flaws. The security flaw 
mentioned here is the small memory of data structure to hold SYN messages. The DDos 
attack creates a network of zombie nodes by first compromising the nodes and installing 
a program in them which also makes them execute attack on other nodes. Two things 
can be said now. One is DDos is spread attack and hence up to a certain cap zombie 
nodes will be created. Second DDos can be facilitating itself i.e. in our cases a honey 
will facilitate further attack. But our intention is to prevent the attack we can deceive the 
attacker into thinking that many nodes are compromised and DDos attack is successful. 
In reality before DDos has spread to normal nodes we have contained the attack among 
a set of self deployed honeypot nodes. These set of nodes are collectively named as 
honey net. So in my proposal DDos is known by the detection scheme defined above 
and it is contained in such a manner that attacker is deceived into thinking DDos is 
ongoing and spreading in the network.  
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Figure 9 Normal nodes 
 
 
 
As previously stated honeypots can be virtual or physical. In computer networks a 
physical computer node can pose as honeypot or it can run a virtual operating system 
connected to internet which will eventually act as honeypot. Another thing to be 
notified is there are high level honeypots and low level honeypots. The former is a full 
functioning network node whereas the later is a network node that simply implements 
the communication protocol stack. In VANET a physical node can be a police car or 
any law enforcer. The virtual node is what we should consider. In order to simulate the 
behaviour of virtual node in the simulation environment a node can be created on the 
simulating software.  
 
 
 
5.2Implementation and Results 
The code snippets and results are shown in this section: 
Figure 8 Normal nodes 
Figure 10 
Honeypot 
Figure 11 
Attacker 
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The Receiver :: 
 
Figure 12Receiver 
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The Sender  :: 
#include<cstdio> 
#include<cstdlib> 
#include<iostream> 
#include<cstring> 
#include<unistd.h> 
#include<sys/types.h> 
#include<sys/stat.h> 
#include<fcntl.h> 
using namespace std; 
int main(){ 
 int l; 
 char buf[256]; 
 char buff[256]; 
 cout<<"Sender NODE is up..."; 
 int fd=open("./myfifo",O_WRONLY); 
 int df=open("./mfifo",O_RDONLY); 
 if(fd==-1){ 
  cerr<<"Error opening fifo:"; 
  return EXIT_FAILURE; 
 } 
 while(1&&strcmp(buf,"done")!=0){ 
 cout<<"\nEnter:"; 
 cin>>buf; 
 write(fd,buf,sizeof(buf)); 
 read(df,buff,sizeof(buff)); 
 cout<<"Acknowledge "<<buff<<"?1)YES \n2)NO\n"; 
 cin>>buf; 
 if(strcmp(buf,"YES")==0){ 
  write(fd,buf,sizeof(buf)); 
 
Figure 13Sender 
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The SYN MESSAGE IMPLEMENTATION:: 
#include "Syn.h" 
Syn::Syn(){ 
 counter = 0; 
 id="NONE"; 
 flag = false; 
 ho=0; 
} 
void Syn::incho(){ 
 ho+=1; 
} 
void Syn::decho(){ 
 ho-=1; 
} 
Syn::Syn(string name="NONE"):id(name),flag(false){ 
} 
int Syn::getcounter(){ 
 return counter; 
} 
void Syn::setcounter(int x){ 
 counter = x; 
} 
void Syn::increment(){ 
 counter+=1; 
} 
void Syn::decrement(){ 
 counter-=1; 
} 
 
Figure 14SYN implementation 
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RESULTS:: 
 
 
 
As shown in the output above 7 half open connections were detected.  
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5.3 Setting the simulation environment 
 
The simulation environment is setup using two different simulators. One simulator is 
used for simulating the vehicular movement and other simulator is set up to run the 
VANET network. SUMO is the simulator for vehicles and Omnetpp is the simulator for 
VANET network.  Both simulator are coupled together to work in coordination. A TCP 
connection is used to connect two simulating environment. Omnetpp is a discrete event 
simulator meaning the state of system changes in discrete time. Thus at regular interval 
of time that is at regular timestamp both simulator share simulating parameters which is 
then used to simulate objects in other simulator. Both of these simulators are installed in 
a Linux system. Various packages to support a GUI interface are also installed. 
Various networking frameworks can be created in omnetpp to model real networks. 
VEINS is the modelling framework to simulate VANET. The whole tcp session and its 
operations are written into VEINS framework. A demo to simulate the vehicle and 
network simulation in coordination is carried out.  
 
 
Figure 15 Running SUMO 
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Figure 16 The corresponding network topology running in Omnetpp 
 
 
Figure 17 Timestamped coupling of two simulators 
 
In Omnetpp a network is called a model which can be created with components like 
nodes, channels and infrastructure. A model is created with keyword network. The 
components of network have type simple which stands for “simple module.”  Simple 
modules can be combined to form a compound module or node. Each node 
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communicates to other node by message passing. Each node has “gates” field which 
describe the input and output port. Messages are passed through a channel. The channel 
is described in network model. Both the network definition and node definition is saved 
a ned file. Below is the code for defining the network and nodes. 
//Honeynet.net 
package honey; 
network Honey 
{ 
 types :  
  channel C extends ned.DatarateChannel { 
   datarate = 27Mbps; 
  } 
 submodules : 
  node1: Node; 
  node2: Node; 
 connections : 
  node1.in <-- C <-- node2.out; 
  node1.out --> C --> node2.in;  
} 
 
//Node.ned 
package honey; 
simple Node 
{ 
 parameters : 
 int syn; 
 int id; 
gates: 
 input in; 
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 output out; 
} 
 
 
Figure 18 Example network 
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Chapter 6 
Future Work and Conclusion 
The predicament of developing VANET protocols and standardization of them do not 
allow proper implementation of any solutions to security threats. For example there is a 
naming problem in VANET as existing IP protocol suite cannot be applied because of 
ad hoc nature of it. Flooding is the basic technique presently in use to carry message 
from one hop to another. In my proposed solution to DDos  I have assumed the sender 
node to have unique id throughout. But unlike computer networks where nodes are 
identified with their IP addresses which are then address resolved to respective MAC 
address. The nodes in VANET are dynamic and the connection is mostly 
extemporaneous in nature.  Without a proper unique naming scheme the method 
described cannot be implemented.  
 
In future VANET will continue to mature and new standards will be introduced for 
different layers especially transport layer. My work can be extended to devise modified 
mechanism to detect and isolate the DDos attack. Honeypots can not only be used to 
tackle DDos but can also be used to defend other security breach like privacy and 
integrity or to catch a cyber criminal. The abstract analogy is of an undercover agent 
hired to infiltrate the organized crime. Thus this field has many open calls for protecting 
the security goals and will continue to stand because criminals are no backward.  
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